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We report that firms reversing impairments under IAS 36 are not more incentivised to engage 
in earnings management and don’t actually engage in more earnings management than a 
control sample matched on size and industry. We observe that reversals are positively 
associated with stock market valuation changes but not with future operating performance.  
Bifurcating our reversal firms into earnings managers and other firms, we report that the 
impairment reversals of the latter are positively associated with future firm performance and 
current stock market returns while those of the former are negatively associated with future 
operating performance and are unrelated to stock valuation.  Thus while on average 
impairment reversals are undertaken in an unbiased manner, a minority of firms exploit the 
latitude provided by this fair value accounting standard to manage earnings upward.  This 
research provides useful information to accounting standard setters pertaining to the adoption 
of fair value accounting methods. It also assists investment analysts by demonstrating how to 
detect opportunistic reversals of impairments. 
 
Keywords: Reversal of impairment losses; firm performance; financial reporting standard; 







This study evaluates unbiased versus opportunistic motives for reversing impairment charges 
in Malaysia.  Malaysia is chosen as the location for the study since the vast majority of its 
public firms disclose the accumulated balance of impairment charges as a distinct item, 
unlike in the UK, where firms tend to aggregate accumulated impairment charges with 
accumulated depreciation.  The paper tests if the reversal of impairment losses by Malaysian 
companies under the Malaysian equivalent of IAS 36 is associated with future firm operating 
performance and current stock price performance. Such reversals of impairments in terms of 
their impact on the balance sheet are analogous to the upward revaluation of fixed assets. 
Aboody Barth and Kaznik (1999) report that the upward revaluation of fixed assets in the UK 
is positively associated with future firm performance and current stock performance.  Aboody 
et al. (1999) conclude that their evidence suggests that revaluations of fixed assets in the UK 
are not unreliable as argued by those who support the US position of not allowing upward 
revaluations of fixed assets.  Just as the primary contribution to the revaluation literature 
claimed by Aboody et al. (1999) is testing whether revaluations are associated with future 
realized operating performance, the primary contribution of this study is the same for the 
reversal of impairment literature. However, the reversal of an asset impairment under IAS 36 
differs from the revaluation of a fixed asset under UK GAAP in one crucial respect:  the 
impairment reversal under IAS 36 increases current earnings whereas the upward revaluation 
of a fixed asset has no effect on current income.  Accordingly, it has been mooted that while 
upward revaluation of fixed assets are reliable, reversals of impairments are not (Chen, Wang 
and Zhao, 2009).  Accordingly, we also examine the impact that the potential use of 
impairment reversals for earnings management purposes has on the relations outlined above. 
 
IAS 36 provides comprehensive guidance on the treatment of asset impairment. This standard 
ordains that if the carrying amount (book value) of a non-current asset is greater than its 
recoverable amount the asset should be impaired.  The recoverable amount is defined as the 
higher of fair value less cost of disposal or value in use.  Malaysian Financial Reporting 
Standard (FRS) 136, which is based on IAS 36, was issued in 2005 and became effective for 
financial years beginning after 1 January 2006.  Reversal recognition is allowed as outlined 
under FRS 136 when the recoverable amount, as defined above, of the impaired asset has 
increased. It is clear that the valuations of assets that have been impaired and subsequently re-
valued upwards are not anchored on their historical costs and their values are based largely 
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on estimations.  This affords management the opportunity to disclose timely and relevant 
information or to obfuscate financial performance. 
 
Duh et al. (2009) is the only study that we are aware of which specifically examines the 
reversal of impairments under an accounting standard based on IAS 36.  Duh et al. (2009) 
claim that their results support the use of the reversal of impairments to manage earnings.  
Specifically, they test if firms with large impairments in the prior year reverse their 
impairments when their pre-reversal earnings would be lower than prior year earnings are 
managing earnings using the reversal.  They find that companies that have made larger 
impairments in a prior period reverse more of these impairments and this tendency to reverse 
is associated with a failure to achieve an earnings benchmark.   They also provide evidence 
that the Taiwanese stock market does not react to the reversal of impairments and infer that it 
sees through the earnings management behaviour.  As pointed out by Aboody et al. (1999) 
the stock return can be influenced by a firm’s financing and other decisions so stock return 
only provides indirect evidence of future operating performance and hence whether the 
impairment reversal is biased or unbiased. 
 
The current study is based in Malaysia which is a common law country whereas the Duh et 
al. (2009) study is undertaken in a jurisdiction that follows a civil law system and prior 
research reports that earnings management is more prevalent in code law countries (Leuz 
Nanda and Wysocki, 2003).  Like Duh et al. (2009) we examine if the reversal of 
impairments is related to stock market performance.  However, we also use a more direct test 
of the association of the reversal of asset impairments with changes in the economic value of 
the previously impaired assets that does not rely on the assumption of a reasonably efficient 
stock market.  Drawing on the literature pertaining to the revaluation of fixed assets (Bernard, 
1993; Easton Edey and Harris, 1993; Aboody et al. 1999): we predict that if a firm is 
motivated to accurately reflect the economic value of an asset by reversing an impairment 
charge and does so in a timely manner, the reversal will be associated with current stock 
market performance and future operating performance.  If reporting incentives underlie the 
decision to reverse the impairment we should not observe these relations.  Furthermore, we 
expect that the reversal of impairment losses will be positively associated with other 
manifestations of earnings management. In particular, we suggest that firms with high 
abnormal working capital accruals are more likely to have opportunistic impairment reversals 
of non-current assets.  The study contributes to the burgeoning literature pertaining to the 
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adoption of IFRS as well as to the literature on asset impairment.  In the former regard the 
study is unusual in that it addresses a specific accrual under IFRS and links its findings with 
respect to this accrual to the more general earnings management literature. 
 
We test our predictions using a sample of 182 Malaysian firms that reported reversals of their 
impairments during the period 2006-2009.  Reversal-firms in the sample are matched with 
firms that have impairment balances available to reverse but choose not to do so.   Firms in 
the control sample must be similar in industrial classification and size to the reversal firms.  
We report that in the year of the reversal firms that reverse impairments are more profitable 
(having controlled for the reversal) than their matched firms.  We also report that, on average, 
the Malaysian stock market values the reversal of impairments positively.  However, we find 
that the reversals on average do not predict future operating performance.  This may be a 
result of some reversal firms delaying the reversal so it is related to current, rather than 
future, operating performance.  Further, it is likely that some of the reversal firms are using 
the reversal of impairments to manage earnings.  Having separated our sample into firms that 
are likely earnings managers and those that are not we provide evidence that the impairment 
reversals of ‘earnings-managers’ are not value relevant and are negatively associated with 
future operating performance.  This contrasts with the results pertaining to firms that we do 
not classify as earnings managers.   For the latter group of firms reversals are positively 
associated with both future operating performance and current stock price performance. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.0 reviews the extant literature 
and develops our predictions.  Section 3.0 describes our data sources, the sample selection 
procedure and the empirical models. Section 4.0 reports the results of the empirical analyses. 
Section 5.0 concludes with a summary of our findings. 
 
2.0 Background and Development of Testable Predictions 
Before the release of FRS 136, the accounting treatment of asset impairment in Malaysia was 
diverse and little guidance was provided regarding when, how and how much impairment 
should be recognised. The standard deals with the impairment of assets and allows for the 
reversal of impairments whenever appropriate. The main objective of Malaysian FRS 136 is 
to ensure that the carrying amount of an asset does not exceed its recoverable amount. The 
carrying value is the book value of the assets while the recoverable amount is the higher of an 
asset’s net selling price and value in use. An impairment loss occurs when the carrying value 
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is higher than the recoverable amount. This difference should be recorded as a loss in the 
income statement and such losses should be accrued whenever the situation arises.  
 
Under IFRS an enterprise should assess at each balance sheet date whether there is any 
indication that the carrying value of an asset is not equal to the recoverable amount.  If there 
is an indication that an impairment loss previously recognized for a particular asset (other 
than goodwill) no longer exists, the company is required to recalculate the recoverable 
amount for the asset and if the recoverable amount in the current period is higher than its 
carrying amount, the impairment loss previously recognized needs to be reversed or partly 
reversed. The recoverable amount for the impaired asset might increase due to internal or 
external factors. Indications for reversals include an increase in the asset’s market value or 
finding that significant changes, with a favorable effect on the entity, have taken place during 
the period.  These changes may pertain to the firm’s technological, market, economic or legal 
environment, a reduction in the market interest rate, significant changes in the extent or 
manner in which the asset is used and lastly indications that the economic performance of the 
asset is now improved or is set to do so in the future.  
 
Most of the early research on asset impairment has been done in contexts other than IFRS 
where impairments cannot be reversed.  Accounting for asset impairment has been claimed as 
giving management substantial flexibility to exercise judgments in determining and reporting 
impairment losses (Titard and Pariser, 1996; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Alciatore et al. 1998; 
Riedl, 2004). For example, the determination of an appropriate discount rate that reflects 
current market expectations and the appropriate risks is often difficult and requires 
consideration and input from financial management, line management and, perhaps, valuation 
professionals. Input from these parties is also required to formulate assumptions regarding 
growth rates used to project future cash flows until the end of the asset’s useful life.  These 
forecasts also require significant judgment.  Titard and Pariser (1996) argue that FASB 
statement no. 121, Accounting for the Impairment of Long-lived Assets and for Long-Lived 
Assets to be Disposed Of, gives managers considerable discretion in the timing and the 
amount of write-downs of impaired assets. Similarly, the use of estimates in projecting future 
cash flows allows managerial discretion in determining the amount of an impairment (Sevin 
and Schroeder, 2005). When managers are provided with choices in determining the value of 
assets, expenses and the profit of their firms, the risk that creative or aggressive accounting is 
employed increases (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Francis et al. (1996) also describe asset 
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impairment as discretionary for the lack of authoritative guidance on accounting for asset 
write-down. They argue that management may take advantage of the discretion afforded by 
accounting rules to manipulate earnings either by not recognizing an impairment when it has 
occurred or by recognizing it only when it is advantageous (to them) to do so. Jordan and 
Clark (2004) reach a similar conclusion by examining the Fortune 100 companies that report 
goodwill impairments. They report that firms taking goodwill impairments in the year of 
study possess significantly lower earnings than their counterparts not recording the write-
down, suggesting that these firms adopt a ‘big bath’ strategy.  
 
With regard to reversals Chen et al. (2009) investigate whether reversals of impairment losses 
among publicly listed companies in China are associated with economic factors or reporting 
incentives.  Their study is not confined to IAS 36 type impairments since they examine 
reversals of impairments of current assets and reversals recognized by disposals.  They find 
that reporting incentives, as a proxy for earnings management, dominate economic factors. 
They also find that asset impairment reversals provide investors with value-relevant 
information, but this association is significantly weaker than other earnings items. Lastly, 
they suggest that high quality accounting standards may not necessarily lead to high quality 
accounting information without the necessary supporting infrastructure for constraining 
managerial opportunistic behaviour.  A more recent study by Zhang et al. (2010) also 
provides evidence of opportunistic impairment reversal reporting by firms listed on Chinese 
stock exchanges during the transition period following the announcement of the prohibition 
of the reversal of impairments by the Chinese regulatory authority. They find that Chinese 
firms made less impairments during the period after the announcement of the ban than they 
had previously made. This result indicates that the ban makes impairments less attractive 
because they can no longer be used as “cookie jar reserves”. They also report that firms with 
previous substantial impairments reversed significantly more impairment losses of long-lived 
assets between the announcement of the ban and the effective date of the ban, thus using up 
the “cookie jar reserves” that would not be available to them in the future. Finally, they report 
that the use of the impairment of long-lived asset was mitigated following the introduction of 
the ban on impairment reversals.  It should be noted that the incentives to manage earnings 
are uniquely strong in China since profitability is vital in retaining listing status on the 
Chinese stock market (Chen et al. 2009).  Thus it is important that the impact of impairments 
be considered in other contexts where the motivation to manage earnings is not as strong and 




In terms of the effect on the balance sheet the reversal of an impairment charge is equivalent 
to an upward revaluation of a fixed asset.  However, the reversal of an impairment can 
directly influence a firm’s income in a way that the upward revaluation on an unimpaired 
asset cannot.  In terms of reflecting the economic fundamentals of the firm the reversal 
should be a harbinger of enhanced future operating performance (Bernard, 1993).  The 
literature initially tests this relation indirectly by examining the relation between asset 
revaluation and stock return. Sharpe and Walker (1975) find that a revaluation announcement 
in Australia is associated with upward share price movements and suggest that the market 
appears to absorb the information quickly.  Easton et al. (1993) investigate the relationship 
between the revaluation of tangible long-lived assets with stock returns and market prices. 
They suggest that an upward revaluation of assets increases their alignment with the market 
value of the firm but the incremental revaluations while value-relevant are not done in a 
timely manner. Moreover, they report that the balance of the revaluation reserve and the 
annual revaluation have significant explanatory power for price-to-book ratios when the debt 
level is relatively high.  Easton et al.’s long window return models explain returns as a 
function of cumulative earnings and revaluation reserve increments (RRIs). A notable feature 
of Easton et al.’s results is that the incremental additions to the revaluation reserve have 
significant explanatory power for returns cumulated over 3-year intervals but not for a 9-year 
interval.  The explanation offered is that the incremental contribution of RRI is ultimately 
subsumed by earnings.  Emanuel (1989) finds no association between revaluation 
announcements and share prices using data from New Zealand.  Aboody et al. (1999) 
investigate the revaluation of assets in UK firms. They report that upward revaluations of 
fixed assets by UK firms are significantly and positively related to future firm performance. 
They also report that current year revaluations are significantly and positively related to 
annual stock returns, indicating that revaluations reflect asset value changes.   
 
Looking specifically at the reversal of asset impairments under IAS 36 we note that Duh et al. 
(2009) report that Taiwanese companies report larger impairment reversals if they have 
previously recognized higher impairment losses.  They note that the relation between prior 
impairments and reversals becomes stronger as current pre-reversal performance worsens 
relative to the earnings of the prior year. However, they do not report any direct relation 
between pre-reversal earnings changes and reversals.  Firms can of course have higher 
impairment balance for a plethora of reasons and it is no surprise that firms with larger 
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impairments in the past have greater reversals.   Duh et al.’s study (2009) is undertaken in a 
civil law country. Countries classified as civil or code law countries have higher levels of 
earnings management than common law countries (Leuz et al. 2003).   Malaysia firms as well 
operating in a common law country also tend to report the accumulated amount of 
impairments charged against non-current assets.  Thus it is very appropriate to undertake this 
study in Malaysia. 
 
We posit that there are two primary motives for a reversal of an impairment charge. The first 
is an unbiased one designed to reflect a positive change in the true economic circumstances 
of the company.  Alternatively, the management of the company may be attempting to 
obfuscate poor current performance using the reversal of a previously created “cookie jar 
reserve” to manipulate earnings upwards. The extant literature pertaining to the reversal of 
non-current asset impairments ordained by IAS 36 based standards has found the reversals 
are done for opportunistic reasons.   The extant literature, however, is concentrated in code 
law countries or where there are extremely strong incentives for earnings management.  In 
this study we consider the possibility of both biased (opportunistic) and unbiased (economic) 
motives for the reversal of asset impairments in a common law country. 
 
If economic motives are driving the reversal of an impairment charge the reversal should be 
associated with enhanced current and/or future operating performance and improved current 
stock price performance.  Thus our first prediction is that if firms are reversing impairments 
for unbiased reasons we will observe that they display superior operating and stock market 
performance relative to a control sample that does not reverse impairments.   
 
However, if reporting incentives are the main drivers of the reversal of an impairment we 
would expect the reversals to be associated with other indications of earnings management, 
for instance, high levels of abnormal accruals or the necessity to beat an earnings benchmark.  
Thus firms that are using impairment reversals to manage earnings will be simultaneously 
employing other methods of artificially increasing earnings.  Importantly, the impairment 
reversals of these earnings managers are not predicted to be positively associated with 
operating performance and stock market returns. 
 
 
3.0 Data and Methodology 
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3.1 Data and Sample Selection  
The annual reports of all public companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
(KLSE) are used to identify reversal firms. Reversal firms are those recognizing at least one 
reversal of an impairment loss in their income statements during the period 2006 to 2009. 
Financial institutions are excluded because they have different accounting and regulatory 
systems for the preparation of companies’ annual reports.  
 
Reversal firms are identified through a keyword search. The keywords used are ‘reversal of 
impairment loss, ‘write back of impairment loss’, ‘written back impairment loss’ and 
‘reversal of diminution in value’. If the search fails to find any of the keywords in the annual 
reports, cash flows statements are further examined in detail to allow for situations where 
companies use different terms to represent the reversal accrual. The reversal amount and the 
type of assets in relation to the reversal are cross-checked in the notes to the account. Only 
impairment reversals pertaining to non-current assets excluding goodwill are collected.  This 
is because FRS 136 is only applicable to non-current assets and it disallows the reversal of 
impairments to goodwill.  Impairment reversals of non-current assets are reported for four 
types of assets: property, plant and equipment (PPE); investment in associates; other 
investment; investment properties. Reversal recognitions from the disposal of fixed assets are 
excluded from the sample as the motivation for the reversal of the impairment may be 
different in the context of a disposal.  Following the above procedure, this study initially 
identifies a sample of 242 reversal firm-year observations relating to 151 distinct non-
financial firms.  
 
3.2 Control group selection procedure 
In order to examine whether firms report impairment reversals opportunistically, we construct 
a control group. The control firms are those firms which had a beginning balance in the 
accumulated impairment losses account in any of four types of non-current assets and did not 
reverse the impairment recognized during the four years of study (2006-2009). The one-to-
one pairing procedure is performed for the 242 observations according to industry 
classification and then firm size.  We control for industry class since the market, and hence 
valuation, of most non-current assets will be industry specific.  Firm size is perhaps the most 
widely used control variable in financial research since it is related to risk and earnings 
volatility.  Importantly size is also related to earnings management measured by either signed 
or unsigned discretionary accruals (Hribar and Nichols, 2007).  We define firm size as total 
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assets and the difference in firm size between the two paired companies cannot exceed 30% 
of the reversal company’s total assets. This pairing procedure ensures that the final sample of 
reversal firms and non-reversal firms are from in the same industry and are of the comparable 
size.  We fail to find a match for 60 of our original sample of 242 firm-years.  Thus, our final 
sample comprises 364 observations made up of 182 reversal firm-years and 182 control firm-
years.  There are 118 distinct reversal firms in the sample and 108 distinct control firms1.  
The sample size of the current study is about twice as large as that used by Duh et al. (2007) 




Table 2 presents the summary statistics for matched reversal firm-year observations from 
2006 to 2009. The difference between the number of reversal firms and the number of 
reversal firm-years indicates that some companies reversed more than once during 2006-
2009. Panel A of Table 2 summarizes the sample breakdown by accounting year end. The 
numbers of reversal observations are 31, 43, 39 and 69 in the years of 2006, 2007, 2008 and 
2009 respectively.  They represent 3.45%, 4.98%, 4.56% and 7.19% of the firms listed on 
KLSE from 2006 to 2009. They generally show an increasing trend of reversal reporting in 
Malaysia except for the year 2008. Table 2, Panel B shows the distribution of reversal 
observations classified by the type of fixed assets. There are a total of 66 (36.26%) 
observations of reversed impairment losses in PPE and 78 (42.86%) firm-years of reversal of 
impairment in other investments. PPE and other investment reversals represent almost 80% 
of the total reversal recognition during 2006-2009. There are 19 (10.44%) and 11 (6.04%) 
firm-years of written-back previously recognized impairment losses in investment in 
associates and investment in properties respectively.  
 
Panel C of Table 2 shows the reversal firm-years breakdown by industry which is based on 
Datastream 4.0 level 3 sector index. Some sectors are merged reducing the number of sectors 
from 16 to 9. This procedure is used to increase the number of non-reversal firms paired with 
reversal firms. In general, the sample comprises a range of industries with most in property 
(26 or 14.29%), industry products (57 or 31.32%), construction and materials (27 or 14.83%), 
travel and leisure (9 or 4.94%) and consumer products (44 or 24.17%).  The other 4 sectors 
                                                 
1 No firm appears in the control sample twice in the same year. 
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with the lowest frequency are technology and telecommunications (7 or 3.85%), industrial 
metals, mining, forestry, paper (8 or 4.40%), oil, gas, water and electricity (2 or 1.10%) and 
media (2 or 1.10%). A comparison between the industry distribution of the sample and the 
overall industry distribution of the market (Table 2, Panel C) shows that the sample is 




3.3 Reversal of impairment losses and firm performance 
FRS 136 allows firms to reverse the impairment recognised previously if the recoverable 
amount, calculated as the present value of the estimated future cash flows from the use of the 
assets or its market value, is greater than the carrying amount.  Thus, if the impairment is 
reversed to reflect economic fundamentals, the reversal is expected to be associated with 
future operating performance as well as contemporaneous stock market performance.  
Accordingly, the following equations are estimated for our sample of 182 companies that 
reverse impairments. We test models of changes in operating performance that are similar to 
those used by Aboody et al. (1999) with respect to the revaluation of fixed assets in the UK 
as well as models of operating performance. 
 
CFOt+1   = α +  β1REVt + β2CFOt + β3WCt  +  β4SIZEt + β5MTBt + εt                                 (1) 
∆CFOt+1 = α + β1REVt + β2∆CFOt + β3∆WCt  +  β4SIZEt + β5MTBt + εt                  (2) 
OPIN*t+1   =  α + β1REVt + β2OPINt + β3SIZEt + β4MTBt +  εt                                 (3) 
∆OPIN*t+1   =  α + β1REVt + β2∆OPINt + β3SIZEt + β4MTBt +  εt                            (4) 
AbReturnt = γ0 + γ1REV’t + γ2NIt + γ3BTMt + ut                                                        (5) 
where, 
CFOt+1 = net cash flow from operations in year t+1 divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆CFOt+1 = the change in net cash flow from operations from year t to year t+1, CFOt+1 - 
CFOt, divided by total assets at end of year t; 
OPIN*t+1 = operating income before depreciation and amortization expenses, reversal 
amount  and AWCA in year t+1 divided by total asset at end of year t;  
∆OPIN*t+1 = the change in operating income before depreciation and amortization expenses, 
reversal amount  and AWCA from year t to year t+1 divided by total asset at end of year t; 
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AbReturnt = control group-adjusted returns beginning eight months before the financial 
year-end and ending four months after the financial year-end;  
REVt  = the reversal amount scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
REV’t  = the reversal amount scaled by the market value of equity at the end of year t-1; 
CFOt  = net cash flow from operations in year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆CFOt  = the change in net cash flow from operations from year t-1 to year t divided by total 
assets at end of year t; 
OPINt = operating income before reversals in year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆OPINt = the change in operating income before reversals from year t-1 to year t divided by 
total assets at end of year t; 
NIt = net income before reversal in year t scaled by market value of equity at the end of year 
t-1; 
WCt  = working capital in year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆WCt  = change in working capital from year t-1 to year t divided by total assets at end of 
year t; 
SIZEt = the natural log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = the market to book ratio at end of year t; 
BTMt = the book to market value ratio at the end of year t-1. 
 
Operating cash flows and operating income in the reversal year, CFO, ΔCFO, OPIN and  
ΔOPIN are included in equations (1) – (4) to control for the effect of the time series 
properties of cash flows and operating income (Aboody et al., 1999).  The variable total sales 
(SIZE) is included in equations (1) – (4) as an additional control for the size effect. The 
market to book ratio, MTB, is used to control for the potential effects of risk and growth 
(Fama and French, 1992; Aboody et al, 1999). Working capital is included in equations (1) 
and (2) as previous research documents a significant relationship between working capital 
and cash flow from operations (Dechow, 1994).    
 
OPIN*t+1 is calculated as net operating income in year t+1 before depreciation and 
amortization expenses, any impairment reversal in t+1 and AWCA. Operating income is 
income before interest and income tax. Interest and income tax are excluded in the 
performance measure because Equation 3A focuses on operating performance (Aboody et al., 
1999). Depreciation and amortization expenses are added back as reversal recognition affects 
the determination of future depreciation. The higher the reversal amount, the larger the new 
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carrying amount of the assets and the new depreciation expense is calculated based on this 
new carrying amount. Aboody et al. (1999) argue that the exclusion of depreciation and 
amortization in the determination of operating income eliminates any mechanical effects of 
reversal on the performance measure. Any reversal of an impairment in year t+1 is also 
excluded since it is not a performance effect derived from the recognition of a reversal in 
year t.  The amount of abnormal accruals does not represent the economic effect of reversal 
recognition.  Accordingly, the amount of abnormal working capital accruals is excluded to 
ensure that the performance measure is not contaminated by earnings management. 
 
It is possible that our Malaysian sample includes some firms that are exploiting FRS 36 to 
manage earnings while others are using it in an unbiased manner.  Thus, we divide the 
reversal sample firms into a group that are likely earnings managers and another that are not. 
We expect earnings managers to use other accruals as well as the reversal of impairments to 
non-current assets to manage earnings upwards.  We assume that it is easier for a firm to 
avoid the detection of earnings management by using smaller accrual adjustments and it 
therefore prefers several small adjustments to a single large adjustment.  We also note that the 
disclosures required by IAS 36 with respect to the reversal of an impairment makes this 
accrual a far less subtle vehicle for earnings management than working capital accruals such 
as inventory value.  For example, firms may undertake the reversal of an impairment of a 
non-current asset using IAS 36 and simultaneously reverse the impairment of current assets 
which are not dealt with by IAS 36.  Therefore, our proxy for earnings management is based 
on the level of abnormal working capital accruals (AWCA) measured by the DeFond and 
Park (2001) model.  This metric captures earnings management using current accruals, 
including impairment reversal of current assets.  We consider this model preferable to a Jones 
type model which includes both current and non-current accruals and is thus contaminated by 
the reversal of impairments of non-current assets.  We confirm the ability of our AWCA 
measure to identify earnings managers by examining its relation with earnings benchmarks 
such as the avoidance of losses and declines in earnings.   
 
DeFond and Park (2001) define abnormal working capital accruals as the difference between 
the current year's realized working capital accruals and the expected level of working capital 
accruals, where the historical relation between working capital and sales captures expected 
working capital. The difference is the portion of working capital accruals that are unlikely to 




AWCAt = WCt – [(WCt-1/St-1) * St]                                                                         (6) 
where:  
AWCAt  = abnormal working capital accruals in year t; 
WCt  = non-cash working capital in year t  that is defined as  
            (current assets - cash and cash equivalent) – (current liabilities – short-term debt); 
WCt-1 = working capital in the previous year; 
St = sales in year t;     
St-1 = sales in the previous year.                 
 
AWCA captures the deviation of the current year’s working capital accruals from the normal 
level of working capital accruals required to support current sales. Thus extremely high levels 
of AWCA are interpreted as indicative of opportunistic income increasing earnings 
management and earnings managers are defined as those reversal companies which are above 
the 70th percentile in terms of AWCA. Firms that are not earnings managers are those who lie 
in the range between 31st and 70th percentile. This procedure yields 55 reversal earning 
managers and 73 reversal non-earning managers: 128 firms in total. Reversal companies 
whose AWCA levels are below the 30th percentile are not included because their level of 
AWCA could be interpreted as income decreasing earnings management. We modify 
equations (1) to (5) to examine the relation between reversals and the future operating 
performance of earnings managers and firms that are not earnings managers.    
 
CFOt+1 = α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3CFOt + β4WCt + β5SIZEt + β6MTBt + εt            (1A) 
∆CFOt+1= α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3∆CFOt + β4∆WCt + β5SIZEt + β6MTBt + εt   (2A) 
OPIN*t+1   =  α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3OPINt + β4SIZEt + β5MTBt +  εt                      (3A) 
∆OPIN*t+1   =  α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3∆OPINt + β4SIZEt + β5MTBt +  εt              (4A) 




D = 1 if the firm is a not an earnings manager, i.e. its AWCA lies in the range between 31st 
and 70th percentile among reversal firms. D takes the value 0 if the firm is an earning 




Equation 1A estimates the relationship between reversal recognition by both earnings 
managers and firms that are not earnings managers and one-year future cash flow from 
operations. The coefficient on REV, β1, represents the relation between the level of 
impairment reversals by earnings managers and one-year future cash flow from operations.  
β2 captures the difference between the effect of reversals on performance for firms that are 
not earnings managers relative to earnings managers.  The sum of β1 + β2 represents the 
impact of reversals by firms that are not earnings managers on future cash flow.  We do not 
expect reversal recognition by earnings managers to explain future cash flow: β1 is not 
expected to be significantly different from zero.  We expect that the reversals of firms that are 
not earnings managers to be more positively associated with future operating performance: β2 
is expected to be positive and significant.  Similarly we predict that β1 + β2 is significantly 
positive.  Equation 2A, 3A and 4A are similar to Equation 1A.  Thus our predictions 
regarding β1, β2 and β1 + β2  are the same.  Finally, equation 5A is used to examine the 
relationship between contemporaneous abnormal returns and impairment reversals by 
earnings managers and firms that are not earnings managers. If the reversal information is of 
sufficient size and is value relevant, it should be positively associated with stock returns; 
whereas, if firms report reversals opportunistically, assuming that the Malaysian market is 
reasonably efficient, the information should not be relevant for the determination of stock 
prices.  The sample size is reduced to 125 observations for the estimation of equation 5A as 
the stock market prices for three observations are not available in Datastream. The coefficient 
on REV’ in Equation 5A represents the relation between impairment reversals by earnings 
managers and abnormal returns, while the sum of γ1 + γ2 captures the effect of reversals for 
firms that are not earnings managers. We expect that reversal recognition by firms that are 
not earnings managers provide timelier value-relevant information to investors as compared 
to earnings managers. Thus γ2 and γ1+ γ2, are expected to be positive and significant. We also 
predict γ3 and γ4 to be positive (Ohlson, 1995). 
 
4.0 Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analyses 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for reversal firms and control firms and also includes 
the test of differences in means and medians for all relevant continuous variables. The mean 
(median) of total assets are 20.096 (20.029) for the reversal firm sample and 20.054 (19.985) 
for the control sample. The differences are not statistically significant. We infer that the 
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reversal firm sample and the control sample are similar in size suggesting that the pairing 
procedure is successful. Unsurprisingly, the beginning balance of accumulated impairment 
losses of reversal firms is significantly larger than non-reversal firms.  
Interestingly, a number of indicators show that reversal firms actually perform better than 
non-reversal firms. Table 3 shows that both the adjusted profit margin (PMadj), and ROEadj, 
the adjusted return on equity ratio of reversal firms, are higher than that of non-reversal firms. 
The mean (median) profit margin of reversal firms, i.e. 0.0633 (0.0544), is different from the 
one of non-reversal firms, i.e. 0.0010 (0.0183), significant at the 5% (10%) level. The 
adjusted mean (median) return on equity ratio of reversal firms, i.e. 0.0733 (0.0814), is also 
significantly, at the 1% (5%) level, different from that of non-reversal firms, i.e. 0.0166 
(0.0540).  
 
Tests (not tabulated) show that 34.6% of reversal firms would have reported earnings 
declines without the reversals whereas 42.9% of non-reversal firms have earnings declines, 
although the difference is not statistically different. Further, control firms are more likely to 
be loss making. 19.8% of reversal firms have a pre-reversal loss but the proportion of loss 
making control firms is higher at 27.5%. The difference is significant at the 10% level. In 
addition, according to our earnings manager indicator reversal firms are not more likely to be 
earnings managers than control firms either. The mean and median of abnormal working 
capital accruals of reversal firms are not significantly different from those of the control 
firms. Assuming that underperforming firms and firms failing to reach a recognized earnings 
benchmark have more incentives to manage earnings upward than firms that are performing 
well, it appears that the reversal firms on average don’t have greater incentives to manage 





We now estimate equations (1) to (5) using data on reversal firms only. As a prelude to this 
analysis Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of all variables used in equations (1) to (5).   
It is noticeable that REV and REV’ which are reversal scaled by total assets and the market 






The regressions results in Table 5 show that while the Malaysian stock market values 
impairment reversals this value relevance is not confirmed by the relationship between 
impairment reversals and future operating performance. A possible explanation for this 
‘puzzling’ result could be that firms do not reverse their impairments in a timely manner. The 
reversal firms in our sample have superior current performance relative to the control firms 
(see Table 3). Thus, their superior stock market performance may be explained by the 
superior contemporaneous operating performance rather than future operating performance. 
Furthermore, returns may reflect a firm’s financing and investing decisions in addition to 
future operating performance, therefore it is possible to observe a positive relation between 
stock returns and the reversal of impairment losses (revaluation) even though this relation 
does not exist between the reversal and future operating performance (Aboody et al, 1999).  
Aboody et al. (1999) offer an example of highly leveraged firms reduce the probability of 
default by revaluing their assets upward influencing stock returns (regardless of future 
operating performance).  Finally, the sample firms are unlikely have similar motivations for 
the reversal of impairment losses: some may be motivated by economic reasons and others by 
reporting incentives.  This may also confound the relation between impairment reversals and 
abnormal returns/future operating performance.  
 
[Table 5] 
   
In summary, the analysis above shows that reversal firms are more profitable than non-
reversal firms.  They also generate more sales than non-reversal firms. Both groups (reversal 
and non-reversal firms) have similar levels of abnormal working capital accruals. Reversals 
are positively valued by the Malaysian stock market but do not predict improved operating 
performance. The beginning balance of accumulated impairment losses (BACC) of reversal 
firms is significantly larger than non-reversal firms. Thus, the preliminary evidence indicates 
that Malaysian firms that reverse impairments are not more likely to be managing their 
earnings upward than firms that do not.  But the failure of the reversal of impairments to 
predict improved operating performance contrasts with Aboody et al.’s (1999) results for 
upward revaluations of fixed assets in the UK. 
 
We suspect that the higher level of BACC and the absence of a positive relationship between 
impairment reversals and improved future operating performance may be indicative of the 
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presence of earning management in some reversal firms. Our sample reversal firms most 
likely include both non-earnings managers and earnings managers, i.e. firms that undertake 
the reversals in an unbiased manner and those that use the reversals as part of (upward) 
earnings management. We define earnings managers as those reversal firms which have the 
top 30% levels of abnormal working capital accruals.  We confirm the effectiveness of this 
AWCA-based classification of earnings manager by comparing the proportion of earnings 
managers that would have had an earnings decline before their reversal of an impairment with 
the corresponding proportion of reversal firms deemed not to be earnings managers.  We find 
that 47% of the earnings managers would have had a decline in earnings before the reversal 
compared with only 26% of the other reversal firms.  This difference is statistically 
significant. 
 
Table 6 presents a difference in differences analysis of earnings managers and firms that are 
not earnings managers in comparison to their corresponding control firms. The table provides 
the mean and median of the differences between reversal earnings managers and their control 
firms, the mean and median of the differences between reversal firms that are not earnings 




Table 6 shows that the mean and median differences in accumulated impairment losses 
between firms that are not earnings managers and their control group firms are significantly 
smaller than the differences between the earnings managers and their control group firms. 
The difference in mean (median) differences between firms that are not earnings managers 
and earnings managers is 0.0130 (0.0024). The difference is significant at the 5% (10%) 
level. This finding is consistent with the theory that earnings managers use impairments to 
create a “cookie jar reserve”. Furthermore, firms that are not earnings managers have higher 
cash flow from operations, CFO, and higher operating income, OPIN, in the reversal year 
relative to their control group firms than earnings managers.  The difference between 
earnings managers and firms that do not manage earnings relative to their control firms is 
particularly significant for OPIN*t, operating income before depreciation, the reversal and 
AWCA in the year of the reversal.  The firms that are not earnings managers also report 
higher operating income in the subsequent year and the difference in mean and median 
differences is significant at the 10% level.  In short, the performance of earnings managers in 
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the year of the reversal is poor relative to non-earning managers and there is some evidence 
that this underperformance remains in the subsequent year.   
 
4.2 The Relation between Reversal of Impairment Losses and Firm Performance 
Future cash flow from operations  
We now turn to the estimation of equations (1A) to (5A) to establish if the impairment 
reversals of earnings managers and firms that are not earnings managers have similar effects 
with respect to current stock market performance and future operating performance.  The first 
two columns of Table 7 present the regression results which display the results from 
estimating equations 1A and 2A which use reversals to predict one-year future cash flow 
from operations and change in cash flow from operations.  The results show that the 
coefficient on reversals, REV, is negative and significant at the 1% level. This result indicates 
that larger reversals by earnings managers are associated with lower future cash flows.  This 
suggests that reversal recognition by earnings managers does not reflect asset value changes 
and is probably opportunistic. The coefficient on D*REV, β2, is positive and significant at the 
1% level, indicating that the reversals reported by firms that are not earnings managers have a 
significantly more positive impact on future performance than the reversals reported by 
earnings managers.  The latter coefficient is larger in absolute terms than β1 and the sum of β1 
+ β2 (not tabulated) is significantly positive at the 1% level (i.e. the positive non-earnings 
manager effect on performance is more pronounced), suggesting that reversal recognition by 
firms that are not earnings managers predicts higher future cash flows.  This finding provides 
strong evidence that the reversal reporting by firms that are not earnings managers is an 
efficient choice of accruals recognition. The results also indicate that, as expected, the cash 
flow from operations in the reversal year is significantly (at the 1% level) and positively 




SIZE, measured by the natural log of total sales, is also positively and significantly related to 
future cash flow from operations. WC and MTB are insignificantly associated with future 
performance. The results pertaining to ∆CFOt+1 are consistent with those above with respect 
to of β1, β2, and β1 + β2.  Accordingly, we infer that the reversals of impairment by firms that 
are not earnings managers are positively reflected in future cash flow performance but those 
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of earnings managers are not.  It is that the reversals of earnings managers have negative 




Future Operating income 
Net operating income (OPIN*t+1) is calculated as net income reported in the income 
statement before depreciation and amortization, the reversal of impairment losses and 
abnormal working capital accruals. Consistent with the results in relation to future cash flow 
(change) from operations, the coefficient on REV, β1, is negative and significant at the 1% 
level.  This result shows that future operating income is reduced when impairment losses are 
used to increase current earnings and is consistent with the prediction that earnings managers 
recognising reversals opportunistically.  
  
The table also provides strong evidence that reversals recorded by firms that are not earnings 
managers explain future profitability measured by net operating income. β1 + β2 is positive 
and significant at the 1% level (not tabulated). As predicted, the coefficient on the interaction 
between REV and dummy variable D.  β2, is significantly positive. This suggests that the 
effect of reversals reported by firms that are not earnings managers on future operating 
income is in the opposite direction as compared to earnings managers and this effect is 
significantly stronger. These findings provide further evidence that reversal firms with 
average abnormal working capital accruals report reversal recognition as stipulated under 
FRS 136 Impairment of Asset to reflect the true economic state of the assets. Regarding the 
control variables, the operating income in the reversal year (OPIN) is positively and 
significantly associated with one-year-ahead adjusted operating income (OPIN*t+1). 
However, SIZE and MTB are not significantly related with one-year future operating income. 
Column Equation 4A displays similar results to those in Column Equation 3A pertaining to 
∆OPINt+1. REV is negatively associated with change in future operating income while 
D*REV is positively associated with change in future operating income. Both associations 
are significant at the 10% level. 
 
To sum up, the association between the recognition of reversal gains and future performance 
is conditional on the level of abnormal accruals. Firms that are not classified as earnings 
managers report reversals which explain future profitability, whereas earnings managers’ 
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reversal recognitions are negatively related to future performance.  In the case of 
(one-year-ahead) future operating income this finding is likely to be related to the tendency of 
working capital accruals, which are high for earnings managers, to reverse in the future. 
 
 
Reversal of impairment losses and stock market returns 
The final column in Table 7 presents the findings related to the value relevance of reversals 
made by earnings managers and firms that are not earnings managers. Reversals reported by 
earnings managers are not associated with abnormal returns, indicating that the reversal of 
impairment by earnings managers is not reflected in stock prices. Consistent with our 
prediction, the coefficient on D*REV is positive and significant (at the 5% level). This result 
suggests that reversals recognized by firms that are not earnings managers are more value-
relevant to investors as compared with reversals information provided by earnings managers. 
Furthermore, the sum of the coefficients on REV and D*REV (not tabulated) is significantly 
positive, indicating that the reversal information provided by firms that are not earnings 
managers is positively valued in the market. As predicted, the coefficient on NI is 
significantly positive.   
 
4.3 Robustness check 
Regression analysis incorporating the beginning balance of accumulated impairment 
losses 
Equations 1A, 2A, 3A, 4A and 5A are constructed without considering the effect of previous 
impairment recognition. Descriptive statistics show that the beginning balance of 
accumulated impairment losses is higher among reversal firms. We conduct additional tests 
on the relationship between impairment reversals and future performance after controlling for 
the beginning balance of accumulated impairment losses, BACC. The number of 
observations in the sample is reduced to 108 (107 for equation 5A) as the amount of 
beginning balance of accumulated impairment losses in relation to 20 reversals are not 
available in the annual reports.  
 
Table 8 shows that BACC does not affect the relationship between reversals and future 
performance. The size of the beginning balance of accumulated impairment losses does not 
explain future performance either. The coefficients on reversals, REV, in relation to four 
operating performance measures are significantly negative. Similar to the ones in Table 7, the 
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coefficients on D*REV are positive and significant. The results in relation to all other 





Regressions with clustered standard errors 
As explained above, the reversal sample of this study consists of 182 firm-year observations 
from 2006 to 2009, associated with 118 firms. The difference in the number of firms and 
firm-years indicates that some reversal firms recognized the reversals more than once during 
the period of this study. Multiple observations of the same firm can affect the estimation 
results as the observations may correlate with each other, creating possible correlated 
residuals (Lang et al., 2006). Hence, we conduct another robustness check where all standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level in the regression analyses. The results of these analyses 




5.0 Summary and conclusions 
Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 136 was issued in Malaysia in 2005 and became 
effective for the financial years beginning after 1 January 2006.  FRS 136 is an adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards in Malaysia.  Such standards being market based 
should allow accounting to better reflect the economic position of the company (Barth et al. 
2008).   However, like any principles based standard the latitude allowed by FRS 136 may be 
exploited by opportunistic management to obfuscate the performance of a company.  In 
particular, the reversal of an impairment which is allowed under FRS 136 may be undertaken 
to better reflect the underlying economic situation of the company or to manage earnings 
upwards. 
 
This study tests if both of the above motivations to undertake the reversal of an impairment 
charge are present in Malaysia with respect to FRS 136.  We follow a paired sample approach 
where reversal firms are matched with non-reversal firms on the basis of size and industry 
class. We document that in the year of the reversal, firms that reverse all or part of an 
impairment perform better than their matched firms as measured by their profit margin and 
ROE ratio adjusted for the reversal. The levels of abnormal working capital accruals of both 
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groups are similar.  Thus, on average there is no evidence that reversal firms manage earnings 
more than those who do not undertake reversals.  We also find that impairment reversals are 
positively valued by the stock market.  However, we note that reversal firms have higher 
impairment balances than control firms and that the superior current operating and, 
particularly stock price, performance of reversal firms is not reflected in enhanced subsequent 
operating performance. While a possible explanation is that the enhanced stock performance 
is justified by the current superior operating performance we also suspect that not all 
reversals are a result of managers appropriately responding to a recovery in the value of 
impaired assets and some may be due to earnings management. Thus, we partition the 
reversal firms into potential earnings managers and firms that are not managing earnings. 
This classification is based on the level of their abnormal working capital accruals in the year 
of the reversal.  For firms we deem not to be managing earnings we confirm that the reversal 
of impairment accruals is positively related to future profitability. Additional tests produce 
similar results on the association between reversals and contemporaneous stock returns, 
providing further support to the notion that manager’s discretion provides useful information 
to the market concerning firm value.  In contrast the reversals of firms that we classify as 
earnings managers are negatively related to future operating income/cash flows and are not 
related to stock performance.  Thus, the information content of the reversal of impairments is 
conditional on indications of the existence of earnings management in the firm. 
 
The findings of this study contribute to and extend the literature on earnings management 
using specific accruals.  Reversal reporting using FRS 136 is claimed to provide managers 
with substantial flexibility in recognizing accruals.  Thus this study is relevant to the general 
literature pertaining to the existence of earnings management under IFRS but unlike most 
other studies (Duh et al. [2009] being a notable exception) it provides evidence based on a 
specific accrual.  We also link earnings management using the specific accrual in question, 
the reversal of an impairment charge, to a more general model of abnormal accruals, the 
DeFond and Park (2001) model, as well as the motivation to avoid earnings declines.  Most 
importantly, our findings provide evidence that most reversal firms recognize the unrealized 
gain that reflects the changes in non-current asset values. Thus, the discretionary element 
provided in FRS 136 allows managers to communicate their expectations about current and 
future firm performance and this is the dominant motivation for the reversal of impairments 
in Malaysia.  Nevertheless, there is a substantial minority of Malaysian firms which use the 
discretion afforded by FRS 136 opportunistically.  Based on our Malaysian results the choice 
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faced by standard setters between allowing or disallowing a the reversal of asset impairments 
comes down to a trade-off between the enhancement of accounting information on average, 
versus the fact that a minority of firms show a tendency exploit the latitude afforded by IAS 
36 and use it to manage earnings upward.  The opportunistic impairment reversers can be 
identified by their abnormally high working capital accruals as well as their need to achieve 
an earnings benchmark (prior year’s earnings).  Their opportunistic use of FRS 136 is 
confirmed by the negative relation of their reversals of impairments with future operating 
performance and the absence of any association between their reversals and stock price 
performance.  The results of our capital markets-based test show that the market in Malaysia 
is reasonably astute in separating those firms which reverse impairments in an unbiased 
manner from those that are exploiting FRS 136 opportunistically.  However, the positive 
response to reversals in general which is not supported by subsequent enhanced performance 
suggests that the market does not fully appreciate the extent of earnings management using 
FRS 136.    
 
We gratefully acknowledge helpful comments and suggestions from Len Skerratt.  
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Table 1. Sample selection 
Sample period: 2006-2009 
Initial identified observations 
Less: Banks and other financial institutions 
          Reversals made for the disposal of fixed assets 
Reversal observations before matching procedure 
Less: Unmatched firms 
Final sample of firms that reverse impairments 
Size and Industry Matched control sample 
Total Sample 












Table 2. Summary statistics of matched reversal firm-years from 2006-2009 
 Number of matched 
firm-years 
Percentage of matched 
firm-years (%) 
Panel A: Year breakdown   
2006 31 17.03 
2007 43 23.63 
2008 39 21.43 
2009 69 37.91 
Total 182 100.00 
Panel B: Type of assets breakdown   
Property, plant and equipment 66 36.26 
Investment in associates 19 10.44 
Other investments 78 42.86 
Investment properties 11 6.04 
Multiple 8 4.40 
Total 182 100.00 
Panel C: Industry breakdown*   
Technology and  telecommunications 7           (37) 3.85         (4.45) 
Industrial metals, mining, forestry, paper 8           (52) 4.40         (6.25) 
Oil, gas, water and electricity 2           (38) 1.10         (4.57) 
Media 2             (7) 1.10         (0.84) 
Property 26         (100) 14.29       (12.02) 
Industry products 57         (222) 31.32       (26.68) 
Construction and materials 27         (112) 14.83       (13.46) 
Travel and leisure 9           (29) 4.94         (3.48) 
Consumer products 44         (235) 24.17       (28.25) 
Total 182         (832) 100.00     (100.00) 
 










Table 3. Descriptive statistics of reversal firm-years and control firms, 2006-2009. 
Variables Assets REV AWCA Sales BACCa PMadj ROEadj 
Test sample: Firm-years with impairment loss and reversals (n=182) 
Mean 20.096 0.0037 0.0007 19.594 0.0176 0.0633 0.0733 
Median 20.029 0.0012 -0.0009 19.406 0.0058 0.0544 0.0814 
SD 1.2746 0.0057 0.0933 1.4535 0.0274 0.1421 0.1386 
Min  17.268 0.0000 -0.2558 16.005 0.0000 -0.4437 -0.3540 
Max 24.286 0.0271 0.2667 24.250 0.0981 0.4717 0.5232 
Skew 0.5642 2.7461 0.2538 0.4396 2.0583 -0.2201 -0.1040 
Kurtos 3.5439 7.8388 4.4581 3.2466 6.0890 6.2709 6.1498 
Control  sample :Firm-years with impairment, without  reversal (n=182) 
Mean 20.054 - -0.0041 19.301 0.0087 0.0010 0.0166 
Median 19.985 - 0.0011 19.299 0.0011 0.0183 0.0540 
SD 1.2628 - 0.1022 1.5934 0.0157 0.2006 0.2356 
Min  17.543 - -0.2768 9.3056 0.0000 -1.3814   -0.8454 
Max 24.091 - 0.2553 23.284 0.0845 0.4078 0.8745 
Skew 0.6189 - -0.4363 -1.1461 2.1752 -3.0857   -1.5067 
Kurtosis 3.5941 - 4.5302 10.627 6.7934 10.355 8.5524 




























The difference (diff) in means and medians between reversal firms and control firms are tested using two-tailed 
t-tests and Mann Whitney test, respectively. 
aThe sample size is 155 reversal observations and 155 control firms. The difference (27) is not traceable as the 
firms combined accumulated impairment and accumulated depreciation into one account. 
All data (except for Assets and Sales) are winsorized at three standard deviations from the mean. 
 
Variable definitions: 
Assets = natural logarithm of total assets at end of year t; 
REV = amount of impairment loss reversal deflated by total assets at end of year t; 
AWCA = abnormal working capital accrual (DeFond and Park, 2001) deflated by total assets at end of year t; 
Sales = natural logarithm of total sales at end of year t; 
BACC = beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss in year t deflated by total assets at end of year t; 
PMadj = net income before reversals in year t divided by total sales in year t; 
ROEadj = return on equity (adjusted), calculated as net income minus impairment reversal in year t divided by 





Table 4. Descriptive statistics for regression variables, n=182. 
Variables Mean Median SD Min Max Skew Kurtos 
Dependent variables      
CFOt+1 0.0657 0.0535 0.0788 -0.1379 0.2736 0.2830 3.4732 
∆CFOt+1 0.0040 0.0093 0.0792 -0.1879 0.1890 -0.3913 3.1741 
OPIN*t+1 0.0807 0.0714 0.1428 -0.2911 0.4472 -0.1704 3.8012 
∆OPIN*t+1 0.0065 0.0042 0.0465 -0.1084 0.1188 0.0168 3.6534 
AbReturnta 0.0524 0.0178 0.6197 -1.3895 1.5129 0.2714 0.2951 
Independent variables      
REV 0.0037 0.0012 0.0057 0.0000 0.0271 2.7461 7.8388 
REV’ 0.0037 0.0013 0.0059 0.0000 0.0273 2.7104 10.509 
CFOt 0.0638 0.0575 0.0729 -0.1165 0.2509 0.4267 3.4326 
∆CFOt  0.0154 0.0158 0.0822 -0.2039 0.2443 0.3567 4.0553 
OPINt 0.0395 0.0375 0.0762 -0.1730 0.26215 -0.0290 4.6022 
∆OPINt 0.0084 0.0082 0.0473 -0.1123 0.1272 -0.1663 3.9225 
NI 0.0778 0.0844 0.1946 -0.4539 0.4835 -0.8682 4.5200 
WC 0.2052 0.2035 0.1954 -0.2169 0.6191 -0.0792 2.6802 
∆WC 0.0191 0.0229 0.0939 -0.1937 0.2320 0.0089 3.4259 
SIZE 19.617 19.406 1.4799 16.005 24.251 0.4136 3.1211 
MTB 0.9728 0.7400 0.6965 0.1900 2.8700 1.3167 3.9299 
BTM 1.4255 1.2500 0.9035 0.1368 3.5714 0.9228 3.2019 
aThe sample size is 178 reversal observations as the data on share price for four reversal observations are not 
available in Datastream.  
All data are winsorized at three standard deviations from the mean. 
 
Variable definitions:  
CFOt+1 = net cash flow from operations in year t+1 divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆CFOt+1 = change in net cash flow from operations from year t to year t+1, CFOt+1 - CFOt, divided by total 
assets at end of year t; 
OPIN*t+1 = operating income before depreciation and amortization expenses, reversal amount  and AWCA in 
year t+1 divided by total asset at end of year t;  
∆OPIN*t+1 = change in operating income before depreciation and amortization expenses, reversal amount  and 
AWCA from year t to year t+1 divided by total asset at end of year t; 
AbReturnt = control group-adjusted returns beginning eight months before the financial year-end and ending 
four months after the financial year-end;  
REVt  = reversal amount scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
REV’t  = reversal amount scaled by the market value of equity at the end of year t-1; 
CFOt  = net cash flow from operations in year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆CFOt  = change in net cash flow from operations from year t-1 to year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
OPINt = operating income before reversals in year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆OPINt = change in operating income before reversals from year t-1 to year t divided by total assets at end of 
year t; 
NIt = net income before reversal in year t scaled by market value of equity at the end of year t-1; 
WCt  = working capital in year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆WCt  = change in working capital from year t-1 to year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
SIZEt = the natural log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = the market to book ratio at end of year t; 









Table 5. Relationship between impairment loss reversals and firm performance 
CFOt+1   = α +  β1REVt + β2CFOt + β3WCt  +  β4SIZEt + β5MTBt + εt                                                           (1) 
∆CFOt+1 = α + β1REVt + β2∆CFOt + β3∆WCt  +  β4SIZEt + β5MTBt + εt                                   (2) 
OPIN*t+1   =  α + β1REVt + β2OPINt + β3SIZEt + β4MTBt +  εt                                                  (3) 
∆OPIN*t+1   =  α + β1REVt + β2∆OPINt + β3SIZEt + β4MTBt +  εt                                             (4) 
AbReturnt = γ0 + γ1REV’t + γ2NIt + γ3BTMt + ut                                                                         (5) 
 
Variable 




















































































































































































Variable definitions:  
CFOt+1 = net cash flow from operations in year t+1 divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆CFOt+1 = change in net cash flow from operations from year t to year t+1, CFOt+1 - CFOt, divided by total 
assets at end of year t; 
OPIN*t+1 = operating income before depreciation and amortization expenses, reversal amount  and AWCA in 
year t+1 divided by total asset at end of year t;  
∆OPIN*t+1 = change in operating income before depreciation and amortization expenses, reversal amount  and 
AWCA from year t to year t+1 divided by total asset at end of year t; 
AbReturnt = control group-adjusted returns beginning eight months before the financial year-end and ending 
four months after the financial year-end;  
REVt  = reversal amount scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
REV’t  = reversal amount scaled by the market value of equity at the end of year t-1; 
CFOt  = net cash flow from operations in year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆CFOt  = change in net cash flow from operations from year t-1 to year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
OPINt = operating income before reversals in year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆OPINt = change in operating income before reversals from year t-1 to year t divided by total assets at end of 
year t; 






WCt  = working capital in year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆WCt  = change in working capital from year t-1 to year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
SIZEt = the natural log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = the market to book ratio at end of year t; 


































Table 6. Difference in differences analysis of reversal earnings managers, reversal firms that are 







reversal earnings managers 
and control firms  
(G1) 
Difference between 
reversal firms that are not 
earnings managers and 

































































































































































































The differences in mean and median differences are tested using two-tailed t-test and Mann Whitney test, 
respectively. 
aThe sample size is 47 reversal earnings managers firms (61 reversal firms that are not earnings managers firms) 
and 47 control firms (61 control firms). The sample size is reduced as 8 observations (12 observations) are not 
traceable as the firms combined accumulated depreciation and accumulated impairment in one account.  
bThe sample size is 53 reversal earnings managers firms (72 reversal firms that are not earnings managers firms) 
and 53 control firms (72 control firms). The sample size is reduced because the market data for 2 observations 
(1 observation) are not available in Datastream. 
The operating income (OPIN) with * indicates the adjustment for depreciation and AWCA. 
 
Variable definitions: 
BACC = beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss in year t deflated by total assets at end of year t; 
ROEadj = return on equity (adjusted), calculated as net income minus impairment reversal in year t divided by 
total equity at end of year t; 
CFOt = net cash flow from operations in year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
CFOt+1 = net cash flow from operations in year t+1 divided by total assets at end of year t; 
OPINt = operating income before reversals in year t divided by total assets at end of year t;  
OPIN*t = operating income before depreciation and amortization expenses, reversal amount  and AWCA in 
year t divided by total asset at end of year t;  
OPINt+1= operating income before reversals in year t+1 divided by total assets at end of year t;  
OPIN*t+1 = operating income before depreciation and amortization expenses, reversal amount  and AWCA in 
year t+1 divided by total asset at end of year t;  
Return = stock returns beginning eight months before the financial year-end and ending four months after the 









Table 7. Relationship between impairment loss reversal and future firm performance, 
moderated by incentive to manage earnings 
CFOt+1   = α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3CFOt + β4WCt + β5SIZEt + β6MTBt + εt                                            (1A) 
∆CFOt+1 =  α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3∆CFOt  + β4∆WCt  + β5SIZEt +  β6MTBt + εt                    (2A) 
OPIN*t+1   =  α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3OPINt + β4SIZEt + β5MTBt +  εt                                                        (3A) 
∆OPIN*t+1   =  α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3∆OPINt + β4SIZEt + β5MTBt +  εt                                                (4A) 
AbReturnt   =  α + D + β1REV’t + β2D*REV’t + β3NIt + β4BTMt +  εt                                                                                   (5A) 
 
Variable 


































































































































































































































CFOt+1 = net cash flow from operations in year t+1 divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆CFOt+1 = change in net cash flow from operations from year t to year t+1, CFOt+1 - CFOt, divided by total 
assets at end of year t; 
OPIN*t+1 = operating income before depreciation and amortization expenses, reversal amount  and AWCA in 
year t+1 divided by total asset at end of year t;  
∆OPIN*t+1 = change in operating income before depreciation and amortization expenses, reversal amount  and 
AWCA from year t to year t+1 divided by total asset at end of year t; 
AbReturn t = control group-adjusted returns beginning eight months before the financial year-end and ending 
four months after the financial year-end;  
REVt  = reversal amount scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
REV’t  = reversal amount scaled by the market value of equity at the end of year t-1; 
CFOt  = net cash flow from operations in year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆CFOt  = change in net cash flow from operations from year t-1 to year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
OPINt = operating income before reversals in year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆OPINt = change in operating income before reversals from year t-1 to year t divided by total assets at end of 
year t; 
NIt = net income before reversal in year t scaled by market value of equity at the end of year t-1; 
WCt  = working capital in year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆WCt  = change in working capital from year t-1 to year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
SIZEt = the natural log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = the market to book ratio at end of year t; 
BTMt = the book to market value ratio at the end of year t-1; 
D = 1 if the firm is a non-earning manager, i.e. its AWCA lies in the range between 31st and 70th percentile 































Table 8. Relationship between impairment loss reversals, firm performance, and incentive to 
manage earnings incorporating accumulated impairment loss 
CFOt+1 = α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3CFOt + β4WCt + β5SIZEt + β6MTBt  + β7BACCt +εt           (1B) 
∆CFOt+1 =  α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3∆CFOt  + β4∆WCt  + β5SIZEt +  β6MTBt + β7BACCt +εt      (2B) 
OPIN*t+1= α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3OPINt + β4SIZEt + β5MTBt + β6BACCt + εt                   (3B) 
∆OPIN*t+1   =  α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3∆OPINt + β4SIZEt + β5MTBt + β6BACCt +  εt              (4B) 
AbReturnt   =  α + D + β1REV’t + β2D*REV’t + β3NIt + β4BTMt +  β5BACC’t  +   εt                                       (5B) 
 
Variable 






















































































































































































































































Variable definitions:  
CFOt+1 = net cash flow from operations in year t+1 divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆CFOt+1 = change in net cash flow from operations from year t to year t+1, CFOt+1 - CFOt, divided by total 
assets at end of year t; 
OPIN*t+1 = operating income before depreciation and amortization expenses, reversal amount  and AWCA in 
year t+1 divided by total asset at end of year t;  
∆OPIN*t+1 = change in operating income before depreciation and amortization expenses, reversal amount  and 
AWCA from year t to year t+1 divided by total asset at end of year t; 
AbReturn t = control group-adjusted returns beginning eight months before the financial year-end and ending 
four months after the financial year-end;  
REVt  = reversal amount scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
REV’t  = reversal amount scaled by the market value of equity at the end of year t-1; 
CFOt  = net cash flow from operations in year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆CFOt  = change in net cash flow from operations from year t-1 to year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
OPINt = operating income before reversals in year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆OPINt = change in operating income before reversals from year t-1 to year t divided by total assets at end of 
year t; 
NIt = net income before reversal in year t scaled by market value of equity at the end of year t-1; 
WCt  = working capital in year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆WCt  = change in working capital from year t-1 to year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
SIZEt = the natural log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = the market to book ratio at end of year t; 
BTMt = the book to market value ratio at the end of year t-1; 
BACCt = beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
BACC’t = beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss scaled by market value of equity at the end of 
year t-1; 
D = 1 if the firm is a non-earning manager, i.e. its AWCA lies in the range between 31st and 70th percentile 
among reversal firms. It takes the value 0 if the firm is an earning manager, i.e. its AWCA is above 70th 
percentile. 
 
 
 
 
 
